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Defensa pasiva: medición y evaluación de la vulnerabilidad urbana con un enfoque de resiliencia
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present research is to measure the level of urban safety based on the principles of 
passive defense, urban leveling based on the degree of vulnerability, the urban infrastructure dispersal 
pattern and important decision-making organizations in the city. The study is based on the urban 
environment, which has been used to measure the vulnerability of the city during the onset of war by 
using spatial indices influencing safety. 
Keywords: passive defense, vulnerability, ANP, AHP, Arc GIS
RESUMEN
El propósito de la presente investigación es medir el nivel de seguridad urbana basado en los principios 
de defensa pasiva, la nivelación urbana basada en el grado de vulnerabilidad, el patrón de dispersión de 
la infraestructura urbana y las importantes organizaciones de toma de decisiones en la ciudad. El estudio 
se basa en el entorno urbano, que se ha utilizado para medir la vulnerabilidad de la ciudad durante el 
inicio de la guerra mediante el uso de índices espaciales que influyen en la seguridad. 
Palabras clave: defensa pasiva, vulnerabilidad, ANP, AHP, Arc GIS.
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Introduction
Civil defense was created during World War II and in efforts to counter the air 
strike, provides shelter and alert civilians. According to various US Department of 
Defense sources, passive defense is a set of measures taken to reduce vulnerability 
and minimize the potential damage caused by the attack of enemy forces (2). Some 
of the measures that can be taken include early and timely warnings, dispersal, 
protection of important individuals and the general public, medical assistance, 
in particular to counteract and reduce the deadly effects of nuclear, biological 
and chemical attacks, weapons of mass destruction, staff training And tactics and 
processes that effectively reduce the damage caused by enemy attacks. In today’s 
wars, it is imperative to take non-operational measures to counter enemy attacks 
and to reduce the damage caused by air, land and sea attacks (4), which is the key 
to all key infrastructures, vital, critical and important military and civilian centers, 
such as refineries, Power stations, ports, airports, large industrial complexes, 
military and political headquarters (6), communication centers, strategic 
bridges, military industries, air bases, missile sites, crowded centers and tactical 
headquarters, support and defense headquarters, and so on.The passive defense 
approach is based on all civilian principles and practices that prevent or minimize 
financial losses to vital and critical military and civilian facilities and financial and 
humanitarian casualties (8). Therefore, the attention of the leaders and officials 
of each community to non-combatant schemes provides the necessary grounds 
for advancing this new approach to promoting the concept of urban safety and 
security. The passive defense structure does not reduce the likelihood of a crisis and 
incident, but reduces the amount of damage to the exposed elements (10).
One of the most important dimensions of social welfare, safety and comfort is the 
potential danger. Providing safety in urban spaces is subject to decision making in 
urban construction and design patterns, tailored to different human groups and 
ecosystem characteristics of each area (Alexander, 2002). Given the importance 
of using inactive passive principles that protect people’s lives in times of crisis, 
the value of some urban parameters affecting the crisis, such as the opening or 
closure of space, the density or dispersion of urban settlements and functions, 
the distance from sensitive uses, proximity to spaces (Eckert, 2008), and Safe 
applications, prediction of shelters in different parts of the city, multi-core urban 
centers against dependency on a center and other indicators of construction and 
urban design (Karbasian, 2011).The purpose of the research is to investigate and 
analyze the natural and human factors influencing the city’s vulnerability from the 
perspective of passive defense. Natural features affecting the city’s safety include 
geographical location, slope, existing faults, surface waters, annual rainfall, and 
so on (Nikoomanesh, 2014). In terms of man-made properties, housing, urban 
facilities and facilities, transportation and traffic, critical sites, urban centers of 
gravity, security-security locations, safe spaces and warning signs at the time of 
the incident can be mentioned (Shakibamanesh, 2015).The following research 
questions are: 1) What are the important spatial and spatial metrics in urban areas 
in accordance with the principles of inertial defense? 2) According to the research 
indicators, what is the status of urban vulnerability in contrast to possible attacks?
One of the most important theories related to passive defense is the theory of five 
loops and the Carver matrix theory. The theory of inspiration derives largely from 
Karl Clausewitz’s thoughts, called the Strategy of Gravity Centers. Clausewitz 
believed that the first task in planning the war was to identify the enemy’s centers 
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of gravity, and if these goals were not carefully and accurately selected, they would 
waste huge human costs, equipment and the loss of vital irreversible opportunities. 
Centers of gravity are centers that are the source of all the movements, activities 
and powers of the country invaded. Iman believes that the most important task 
in planning a war is to identify the centers of gravity of the country and if these 
centers are carefully identified and targeted, the invading country, in the first days 
of the war, would taste the defeat of the military and in the shortest possible time 
to the demands The invading country will surrender and surrender. The model of 
the five strategic engagement rings is precisely the invasion country as the human 
body’s organs, so that if the brain and nerves (nerve centers, foodstuffs required 
for systemic and circulatory), limbs and legs (the motor system) The spirit and 
mind, the will and the defense system of the human body (defense cell) from 
human beings, will not be able to perform any activity and movement, if the five 
clashes in the country were destroyed by the invasion, he paralyzed him, defeated 
and surrendered his early will be.Another method of passive defense is the seventh 
criterion for choosing the best target from the enemy (Carver’s Matrix Method). 
The criteria for the study, which are registered as an accepted and enforceable 
theory with various applications in the relevant sources, can be identified as Carver 
Matrix. The word “carver” is the first letter of the sixth criterion of prioritizing 
goals or choosing the best goal. These criteria include: target significance and 
sensitivity, target accessibility capability, ability to restore and restore target, target 
vulnerability, target impact, target detection capability, economic value of tanks 
and currency yields. 
To determine each of the criteria in enemy attack scenarios, the seven criteria are 
scored on a scale from 1 to 10 based on its status for the enemy. Then, each of 
the scores derived from each benchmark is set in the final table, the goal with the 
highest score is the best target for the attack. In the course of further studies and 
further studies, another criterion, which is actually the seventh criterion, is added 
to the six criteria according to the economic value of the buildings and the return of 
its currency and its rivals, which is in fact the effect of the destruction of the target 
in the world’s public opinion. Accordingly, terrorist and subversive operations are 
more important than critical, critical and critical infrastructure sites. These centers 
and facilities, which are largely dependent on centralized information technology 
systems, include demographic centers, telecommunication centers, energy supply 
facilities, electricity, water, food factories, transportation systems, and more. That’s 
why the focus of terrorist acts on these types of networks has increased. In enemy’s 
view, it is a vulnerable target with a diameter of 400 meters, such as an air base, 
a missile base, a large industrial complex, and so on. Based on the size of their 
location and degree of importance, the various vulnerable areas of the city are in 
table 1.
Table 1. Vulnerable infrastructure and related elements
Transport infrastructure Roads, highways, lines and railway stations, subways, 
airports, pipelines include: natural gas transmission lines, 
crude oil and other hazardous materials.
Oil and gas production and 
accumulation infrastructure
Main crude and natural gas reservoirs, storage facilities 
and refined oil and gas tanks, refineries and petrochemical 
and chemical plants
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Water supply infrastructure Dams, municipal water tanks, storage facilities, refiners 
and transmission systems including pipelines and cooling 
systems
Emergency Services Infrastructure Hospitals, health centers, police stations, fire centers, 
relief and rescue centers
Public-Cumulative Infrastructure Hotels, hospitality, shopping malls, recreational and 
tourism centers, religious places, cold stores, wheat silos, 
factories and food depots
Methodology
In this study, applications were categorized into 11 main categories to measure 
vulnerability. Given the super matrix’s attitude, most notably known as the 
Analytical Network Process (ANP), it is an attractive tool for better understanding 
of decision making and overcomes the constraints of hierarchical structures. 
Therefore, the ANP model was used to evaluate the applications. Such a system 
can be represented by a directed grid, in which a surface or cluster may, directly 
or indirectly, also be affected by other features of the decision (or elements) and 
surfaces (or clusters), and also influence. The emphasis in this research is on some 
of the principles of inactive defense, which has been tried to evaluate and analyze 
various layers in the statistical and graphical software environment according to 
these scales.The reason for choosing an ANP method for measuring the criteria 
and sub-criteria is that in addition to verifying the goals, criteria, sub-criteria, and 
finally the options, to measure horizontally all items together and each option with 
the same according to the research model. Based on this, we first compared and 
evaluated the eleven users, and then the intra-group criteria of each indicator were 
compared. The way of valuation and importance of applications and information 
layers has been done in two steps. In the first step, the main applications with each 
other and the subcomponents of each group are also combined with the ANP model 
in the Super Decisions software environment. In the second step, the 20 layers 
of information that have played the most role in the discussion of vulnerability 
and passive defense have been extracted. Their vector maps are converted into 
lattice layers in the ArcGis software environment, and then the scores of each 
layer are evaluated with the help of the AHP model in the Expert Choice software 
environment and, accordingly, the importance of each layer is taken into account 
in the final selection of vulnerable and non-vulnerable locations. To evaluate and 
grade the criteria and sub-criteria and their role in safety, 10 of the non-urban civil 
defense experts who worked in various organizations, including law enforcement 
and housing and urban planning, have been used. Information layers are GIS 
maps that are extracted from urban detailed plans and evaluated and compared 
by experts.
Table 2. Vulnerable infrastructure and its related elements
Vulnerable 
infrastructure
Elements
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Transport 
infrastructure
Roads and highways, lines and railway stations, subways, airports, 
pipelines including natural gas transmission lines, crude oil and other 
hazardous materials
Oil and gas 
production and 
accumulation 
infrastructure
Main crude and natural gas reservoirs, storage facilities and refined oil 
and gas tanks, refineries and petrochemical and chemical plants
Water supply 
infrastructure
Dams, municipal water tanks, storage facilities, refiners and 
transmission systems including pipelines and cooling systems
Emergency Services 
Infrastructure
Hospitals, health centers, police stations, firefighting centers and relief 
and rescue centers
Public infrastructure 
- people
Hotels, hospitality, shopping malls, recreational and tourism centers, 
religious places, cold stores, wheat silos, factories and food depots
Table 3. Dimensions and criteria of passive defense in urbanization
Dimensions Definitions and measurement criteria
Miniaturization Reducing the meaning of decentralization, the formation of urban centers 
and the establishment of various branches of the city. Having multiple 
locations as the city center instead of a specific location.
Preventing the emergence of metropolises and the distribution of the 
population in the middle and small cities. Reduce the diameter of 
important buildings and buildings.
Optimal Scale Attention to the hierarchy of urban activities and the definition of city, 
district, neighborhood, neighborhood and so on functions. Determine the 
optimal scale of population deployment and activity in space. The optimal 
distribution of gardens and green spaces on a wide scale, the breadth and 
hierarchy of communication networks.
Functional 
dispersion
Separating the expansion and diffusion of centers, facilities, equipment 
and facilities with various activities within a reasonable time to reduce 
their vulnerability to enemy operations.
Distribution of population and national capital in the whole territorial 
space through the application of territorial policy and the dispersion of 
key and critical infrastructure. Avoiding points with population density 
and high construction density, lack of open spaces during congestion, 
central office centers, fine texture and so on. Proximity to open spaces, 
green space, access to the communication network, cobblestones and 
others.
Strengthening Refers to structures designed to protect critical, critical, and critical 
facilities, in appropriate locations, in order to withstand bombs, rockets, 
missiles, bullets, etc., to prevent damage to persons, equipment and 
facilities It will neutralize the effects of cracking and explosion wave. 
Avoiding worn and damaged textiles, hazardous urban facilities such as gas 
lines, electricity, gas pumps, etc. Proximity to office buildings, refuges and 
dams. Buildings complying with architectural and urban standards, places 
away from faults and flood, places with a suitable slope, and so on. How 
to use and retrofit, instrumental and non-structural elements of the city to 
reduce the damage caused by the explosion.
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Optimal location The location of choice is the best and most desirable point and location, so 
that it can best conceal and hide the manpower, equipment and activities. 
Quality of urban form compatibility with applications, pedestrian 
network, cavalry, information network, etc. If urban neighborhoods are to 
be adhered to and noncompliant uses are not together, rapid depletion can 
be provided.
Multi-functional 
spaces
The possibility of multilateral utilization of urban and architectural 
spaces during the crisis, the creation of dual and sometimes multipurpose 
structures. In the city of Moscow, the design of spaces and indoor places of 
the city train system is such that in addition to moving in normal times, 
the ability to resettle and provide the necessary supplies of more than two 
million citizens for a period of about a month.
Determine the geometric design of the building, the location of the 
openings, how to access, as well as predict the cases and determine the 
multi-functional space for each building at the time of the crisis.
Cheaping and 
Innovative
Paying attention to the profit-to-cost ratio, and the best response to other 
threats and the use of creativity for optimal use of features.
Permeability In terms of access and physical and visual access between two points, 
the feature is used to describe the city’s communication network and a 
definition for the readability of paths and the density of access in urban 
context.
The number of potential paths from one point to another, the type of 
urban texture (planned or organic), the scale of the blocks, the order and 
the core of the communication network, the degree of confinement, the 
size of the texture, the filling and empty of urban spaces.
Homogenization Creating a region or set with different layouts of various functions as 
an integrated body with a homogeneous background can disrupt the 
perception of unauthorized persons. The conventional methods in 
this regard are to make changes in the form, shape, type of access and 
appearance in a variety of ways, including the use of green space coverage.
independency Each city in a region should have the ability to act independently at the 
time of the incident and not dependent on other cities (the center of the 
country or province) for the rescue or supply of food. At the urban level, 
other infrastructure of other neighborhoods (such as water, electricity, 
gas, etc.) should not be left open with infrastructure damage in particular 
neighborhoods.
Table 4. Comparative Measurement Scale
Dimensions Definitions and measurement criteria
Permeability In terms of access and physical and visual access between two points, 
the feature is used to describe the city’s communication network and a 
definition for the readability of paths and the density of access in urban 
context.
The number of potential paths from one point to another, the type of 
urban texture (planned or organic), the scale of the blocks, the order and 
the core of the communication network, the degree of confinement, the 
size of the texture, the filling and empty of urban spaces.
Homogenization Creating a region or set with different layouts of various functions as 
an integrated body with a homogeneous background can disrupt the 
perception of unauthorized persons. The conventional methods in 
this regard are to make changes in the form, shape, type of access and 
appearance in a variety of ways, including the use of green space coverage.
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independency Each city in a region should have the ability to act independently at the 
time of the incident and not dependent on other cities (the center of the 
country or province) for the rescue or supply of food. At the urban level, 
other infrastructure of other neighborhoods (such as water, electricity, 
gas, etc.) should not be left open with infrastructure damage in particular 
neighborhoods.
Table 5. Valuation of the safety level of urban use during incidents
Description Description Description
The two elements have the same 
importance.
The same importance 1
An element has a modest advantage 
over another element.
Moderate advantage 3
An element is superior to the other 
element.
High excellence 5
An element has a great advantage over 
another element.
Awesome excellence 7
An element has an extraordinary 
superiority to the other element.
Extremely high superiority 9
Intermediate cases in judgment. Intermediate values 2,4,6,8
Figure 1. Comparison of criteria and sub-criteria (primary and secondary uses) 
by using the ANP model in the Super Decisions software environment
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Results
Comparison of applications in terms of safety Due to the nature of each user 
and its compatibility with the principles of passive defense, applications have a 
special value. This valuation is based on the Thomas Saaty 1 to 9.In the next 
step, in addition to comparing the main uses with each other, the nature of the 
ANP method is compared to the sub criteria of each major criterion.The value 
and importance of safety of some urban applications such as agricultural land, 
topographical effects, and urban green spaces is more than other uses, and some 
uses such as industrial units, gas networks and other facilities have the lowest score.
In addition to evaluating the applications, according to the experts’ opinion, the 
significance of the nineteen-dimensional coefficients was evaluated using the AHP 
model and the coefficient of significance of each layer in the ArcGis environment 
was multiplied in the layer. According to the comparison, the layers with the 
highest coefficient of significance include the following: urban land use (0.19), 
population density (0.14), military buildings dispersion (0.115), construction 
density (0/088) and the distribution of urban facilities (0.068). The Euclidean 
method has been used to estimate the distance from the layers.Validation based 
on distance from the six main layers provided by these layers includes roughness’s, 
industries, sports fields, Red Crescent Center, health centers and green spaces. The 
distance obtained from the Euclidean method is obtained (the shortest distance 
between two points). Based on the Euclidean distance, 10 distances range from 
minimum to maximum.In addition to discussing the appropriateness of use and 
the distances from incompatible uses, the principle of lack of congestion, lack 
of focus and dispersion is very important. Accordingly, important administrative 
buildings should be distributed in such a way that the enemy with the least 
operational and military movements cannot cause serious damage to all buildings 
or the population is more exposed. So, by creating various branches, an important 
user can follow his or her normal life. 
Considering the analysis of the values  of inactive layers affecting the passive 
defense using the ANP and AHP statistical models, as well as the spatial analysis 
performed in the ArcGis software environment, the vulnerability of various urban 
neighborhoods has been determined and its results in six spectra with the titles 
of the vulnerability are very high, high, low, relatively low, low and very low. By 
studying the strengths and opportunities of urban safety, it will be determined 
that most of the parameters affecting safety improvement are related to natural 
features and urban macro foot, but in terms of building management and urban 
construction, dispersion and congestion, population spatial distribution, habitats 
and equipment Urban, transportation and communications have weaknesses and 
threats that can put the future of the city at risk. In other words, many urban 
decision-making and decision-making processes have not been appropriate in the 
process of distributing activities, services, and applying criteria. The city lacks any 
public shelter at the city level or the county seat defined in the residential units. 
The pattern of distribution of office buildings and decision-making centers is 
concentrated in three parts of the city, with an emphasis on the central part of the 
city. Although some units and military centers have been placed outside the city, 
some important centers and police decisions are at the provincial and city police 
headquarters in residential areas.
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Table 6. Major and secondary user privileges based on safety appropriateness 
using the ANP model in the Super Decisions software environment
Main applicationsSub categoriesIdiomSafety fitPercentage proportion
Administrative-law 
enforcement
OfficialAdministrator0,066
Law enforcementMilitary0,033
Commercial
Business AxesEconomic Row0,033
Business locationsEconomic Place0,0181,8
Cultural-historical
Historical buildingsHistorical Structure0,0111,1
cultural centersCultural centers0,033
Religious buildingsReligious Structure0,022
Ruined buildingsDilapidated Structure00
Educational
Industrial
Facilities and 
equipment
High schoolHigh school0,0232,3
Primary schoolsSchool0,0202
Academic CentersUniversity Center0,0434,3
industrial unitsIndustrial units00
Substation gas linesSecondary Gas line00
Main gas pipelinesMain Gas Station00
Important Gas Supply 
StationsMain Gas Station00
Other urban facilitiesOther Installation00
Health-Therapy
Health-TherapyHygienic Center0,0202
Health centersMedical Center0,077
Construction density
Open spaces and 
natural elements
Low build densityLow Density 
Constructional0,066
Moderate construction 
density
Medium Density 
Constructional0,022
High build densityHigh Density 
Constructional00
green spaceGreen Space0,0757,5
FarmlandAgicuip0,088
Natural obstacles 
(topography)Topography0,088
Sports groundsSport land0,0676,7
Bayer landWild land0,077
CemeteryCemetery0,0404
communication 
network
Main streetsMain Street0,066
Second class streetsSecond Street0,0313,1
Marching pathsWalk Ability00
Other streetsOther Street0,0272,7
total1100
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